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Too many children remain at risk of harm, regrettably, in all too many societies. This is despite the
almost universal acceptance of the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC). Its intention, arguably somewhat naı¨vely, is to create two state imperatives: to protect
children against threats of harm; and to advance their welfare. Governments, however, have evidenced a
pragmatic reluctance to meet these challenges, perhaps a product of conflicting community expectations
on the appropriate role of the state, combined with a scarcity of public resources. For the state to meet
its UNCRC obligations requires it to have three crucial capacities. The first is the governance capacity
to be able to take the necessary actions to prevent or correct the harm experienced by children. The
second is the organizational capacity to direct sufficient resources to do what needs to be done in a
timely manner, in a culturally sensitive way, and without causing them other forms of harm. The third
is the epistemological capacity to know when it is in the “best interests” of children for the state, in the
“public interest,” to stop particular child practices or to separate particular children from their families
in order to provide the care and protection they need. These are the ultimate challenges facing
governments if they wish to achieve the vision of the state as the protector and promoter of the best
interests of children that is embedded in the UNCRC, to which almost all states have committed.
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Introduction
Too many children remain at risk of harm, regrettably, in all too many
societies (see United Nations Children’s Fund, 2011, Table 9, pp. 122–123). This is
because of the inability or unwillingness of adults in families, communities, and
governments to protect them, to advance their well-being, and to promote their
future development. Korbin (1991) defines three categories of harmful practices:
 Harm caused by cultural differences in child-rearing behavior and the practices
that may be judged to be harmful by those outside the culture, such as female
genital mutilation or the use of insufficiently nurturing institutional care.
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 Harm caused by idiosyncratic departure from the parenting norms prevalent
in a culture.
 Harm caused because of poverty, war, or lack of healthcare or nutrition.
Societies provide for the needs of children according to their underlying
culturally informed values with respect to parental responsibilities and indepen-
dence, social solidarity, and the worth and dignity of a child (Gilbert, Parton, &
Skivenes, 2011; Welbourne & Dixon, 2013). These social constructions inform the
way children are—and should be—protected and cared for by their families;
the contribution they are expected to make to their family as family members, as
income earners, or as commodities for sale; through their responsibility for the
continuation of the family line, and their role in upholding the honor and esteem
of the family. These give rise to culturally informed constructions of what
constitute appropriate parental behaviors, acceptable childcare practices (and
child behaviors), and the rights of parents, all of which shape public child
protection and welfare policies and practices.
Over 60 years ago, Bowlby (1951) made a simple but seminal contribution to
advance the global child protection and welfare discourse by presenting the case
for state intervention into the family domain to protect and advance the well-
being of children in the event of “family failure.” He defined (p. 423) this as
situations where:
 a family has never been established (illegitimacy);
 a family is intact but dysfunctional (parental poverty, incapacity, or psychopa-
thy); or
 a family has broken up and is not functioning through, for example, parental
death, desertion, separation, hospitalization, imprisonment, relocation due to
employment, or social calamities (war or famine).
Children are, however, placed at risk of parental neglect and impaired family
care and support for reasons beyond “family failure.” Some traditional cultures
place children at risk, especially girl-children, by endorsing and tolerating such
practices as female feticide and infanticide, female genital mutilation, family
honor murders and suicides, and child marriages. There are also family structures
that can impact negatively on children as members of the family—such as
polygamous marriage—if they are in a disadvantaged position within that family,
or on children married under duress into such families. This is happening, for
example, in the Middle East, where under traditional cultural values children are
the property of parents and the extended family (Al-Krenawi & Kimberley, 2013),
and in India, where child neglect is exacerbated by widespread poverty (Stanley,
2013). Indeed, poverty creates risks for all children (Ferguson, 2006), but it is
associated with particularly catastrophic risks for girl-children, through child
labor, child pornography and prostitution, and child marriages, so graphically
portrayed in Stanley’s (2013, pp. 172–183) harrowing description of the plight of
vulnerable children in India. However, extended families carry benefits for
children in some instances and contexts, as discussed by Sossou (2013). The wider
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social context that influences the level and nature of choices exercised by the
adults with respect to children is a critical factor in shaping the impact that
cultural practices have on children.
Almost 40 years after Bowlby made his seminal contribution, children have—
after much suffering as defenseless individuals in the hands of adults-as-parents
or as exploiters—acquired a universal set of rights. This covenant articulates the
rights and, by implication, the basic needs of children in the full diversity of
social, political, and economic contexts in which they grow up. It is to this
covenant that attention is now turned.
Demarcating the Role of the State-as-Parent
The 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
(UNICEF, 2012) is a declaration of principles by the international community
about what children have a right to expect from adults:
It reflects a new vision of the child. Children are neither the property of
their parents nor are they helpless objects of charity. They are human
beings and are the subject of their own rights. The Convention offers a
vision of the child as an individual and a member of a family and a
community, with rights and responsibilities appropriate to his or her age
and stage of development. Recognizing children’s rights in this way
firmly sets a focus on the whole child. Previously seen as negotiable, the
child’s needs have become legally binding rights. No longer the passive
recipient of benefits, the child has become the subject or holder of rights.
It created an imperative for the state to reduce an array of harmful adult
behaviors and child practices that threaten the rights of children (Finkelhor &
Korbin, 1988; Friedman, Horwitz, & Resnick, 2005; Korbin, 1991), and to take the
necessary and appropriate steps to protect and advance their well-being. This it
does by giving children, essentially, a universal right to be protected by the state,
within cultural and religious constraints, from preventable risks, traumas,
commercial and familial exploitation, maltreatment, abuse, and compromises to
their normative development as a result of
1. acts of omission by the state (such as failing to act in the event of child neglect,
maltreatment, and abuse, or failing to prohibit child labor, pornography,
prostitution, marriage, trafficking, female infanticide, female genital mutilation,
family honor murders, or recruitment as soldiers); or
2. exposure to traumatic events (such as famine, military conflict, political
violence, or domestic violence).
The following principles underpin the UNCRC-endorsed role of the state in
advancing the rights and welfare of children:
 That “every child has the inherent right to life” (Article 6 (1)).
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 That it is “the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality, name and family relations” (Article 8).
 That “the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” in all
institutional actions concerning children (Article 3), and in particular with
respect to the system of adoption (Article 21).
 That “every child [has the right] to a standard of living adequate for the child’s
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development” (Article 27 (1)).
 That every “child [has the right] to be protected from economic exploitation
and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere
with the child education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical,
mental, spiritual, moral or social development” (Article 32 (1)).
 “That a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will,
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary
for the best interests of the child [particularly in cases] involving abuse or neglect
of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a
decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence . . . [‘on the basis that it
is the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except
if it is contrary to the child’s best interest’ (Article 9 (3))]” (Article 9 (1)).
 That “a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full and decent
life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate the
child’s active participation in the community” (Article 23 (1)).
The UNCRC envisages the state as a surrogate parent, intervening in the
family domain by abrogating the family’s responsibility for the well-being of a
child, in the following circumstances:
 When “a child [is] temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family
environment” (Article 20 (1)).
 When in a child’s “own best interests [he or she] cannot be allowed to remain in
that [family] environment” (Article 20 (1)) because of “abuse or neglect of the
child by the parents” (Article 9 (1)), including being subjected to any form of
“physical or mental violence, injury or abuse [including ‘torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (Article 37)], neglect or
negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse [includ-
ing ‘the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual
activity’ (Article 34 (a)) and ‘the exploitative use of children in prostitution or
other unlawful sexual practices’ (Article 34 (b)), and ‘in pornographic perfor-
mances and materials’ (Article 34 (c))], while in the care of parent(s), legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child” (Article 19 (1)).
This assumption of responsibility by the state for child protection and welfare
is, however, subject to the following caveats, specified in the UNCRC Preamble:
 “that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly
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children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community”;
 “that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of
happiness, love and understanding”; and
 “[that] due account [should be taken] of the importance of the traditions and
cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development
of the child,” which requires the state to identify which cultural practices
require state attention as child protection and advancement issues.
The UNCRC, thus, cajoles the state to
 “render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the perfor-
mance of their child-rearing responsibilities” (Article 18 (2)); and
 “take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working parents
have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they
are eligible” (Article 18 (3)).
The international community has not, however, achieved universal agreement
on its child rights program. One country, the United States of America, has not
ratified the UNCRC—on the fundamental grounds that the rights granted to a
child undermine parental choice—despite calls for so doing from some lobby
groups. Other countries have their own concerns about the interpretation and
implementation of children’s rights. The extent and nature of the points of
contention can be observed in the interpretative declarations and reservations
expressed by signatory countries.1 These significantly reduced the effectiveness of
ratification as a way of strengthening the child rights that the UNCRC grants.
There is a fundamental disagreement over when a “child” acquires the rights
granted under the UNCRC—at birth or at conception—so giving rise to a
potential conflict between any right to life of an unborn child, and adult rights to
make choices about being a parent once a child is conceived.
 “The United Kingdom interprets the Convention as applicable only following
a live birth.”
 “The Government of the French Republic declares that this Convention,
particularly article 6, cannot be interpreted as constituting any obstacle to the
implementation of the provisions of French legislation relating to the volun-
tary interruption of pregnancy.”
 “With reference to article 1 of the Convention [which defines a child as a
human being under the age of 18], the Government of Guatemala declares that
article 3 of its Political Constitution establishes that: ‘The state guarantees and
protects human life from the time of its conception, as well as the integrity
and security of the individual.’”
Disagreement about when a child ceases to be a child and so becomes eligible
to exercise adult rights, such as participation in warfare, is a basis for the
expression of reservations:
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 “Spain ... wishes to express its disagreement with the age limit fixed therein
and to declare that the said limit appears insufficient, by permitting the
recruitment and participation in armed conflict of children having attained the
age of fifteen years.”
 “With reference to article 1 of the Convention, the Government of the Republic
of Cuba declares that in Cuba . . .majority is not attained at 18 years of age for
purposes of the full exercise of civic rights.”
The rights granted to children that involve legal procedures are a point of
contention. With respect to adoption, for example:
 Egypt opted out of any commitment relating to adoption on the basis that this
is not part of Sharia law, with the assertion that although Sharia provides
various ways of providing protection and care for children, this does not
include adoption.
 Poland reserved the right to limit adopted children’s right to know who their
biological parents are, instead preserving the right of adoptive parents to
maintain the confidentiality of the child’s origins where the law provides for this.
Reservations grounded in the compatibility between the rights granted under
the UNCRC and religion-based national laws are, in some cases, expressed in
general terms:
“The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan reserves the right to express
. . . reservations on all provisions of the Convention that are incompatible
with the laws of Islamic Sharia and the local legislation in effect.”
The incapacity of developing countries to grant immediately all the child
rights to be protected and advanced under the UNCRC has also given rise to
interpretative declarations that make their national “implementation” an aspira-
tional statement of intent:
 India reserved the right to progressively implement provisions relating to child
labour, “[w]hile fully subscribing to the objectives and purposes of the
Convention, realizing that certain of the rights of child, namely those pertaining
to the economic, social and cultural rights, can only be progressively
implemented in the developing countries, subject to the extent of available
resources and within the framework of international cooperation; recognizing
that the child has to be protected from exploitation of all forms including
economic exploitation . . . the Government of India undertakes to take measures
to progressively implement the provisions of article 32 [relating to child labor].”
In 1991—the year after the process of ratifying the UNCRC began—Korbin
(1991, p. 70) dauntingly challenged the international community by posing the
following question: “Is a universal definition [‘of the spectrum of caretaker
behaviour accepted by different cultures’] possible, or will definitions of necessity
be culture specific?” The contemporary answer must reflect that parental agency
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occurs in a diversity of sociocultural, religious, and economic contexts, and
reflects the informing culture-specific values of a society with respect to children,
childhood, and parenting.
There is a clear diversity of public approaches in response to the threats and
challenges related to child protection and welfare support in their jurisdictions
(Welbourne & Dixon, 2013). At one polar extreme is the proposition that the
state’s role should be limited to targeted child protection and a residual child
welfare support, grounded on the proposition that the state should substitute for
the family’s fulfillment of its duties only in the event of clear “family—including
extended family—failure,” which emphasizes safeguarding children against harm
(child protection) (Fargion, 2012). This approach has as its focus the protection
and support only of children at high risk of harm due to inadequate parental
care, ill treatment, or abuse by “degenerate relatives” (Gilbert et al., 2011, p. 3). At
the other polar extreme, the proposition is that a child’s well-being can be put at
risk by parental behaviors explainable by temporary family conflict or dysfunc-
tionality arising from social and psychological difficulties (Fargion, 2012). This
justifies the state intervening in the family domain in order to enhance the
family’s functionality and, thus, advance children’s well-being. This approach has
as its focus proactive and inclusive child protection and universal child welfare
support that enhances parenting capacity by having in place flexible early-
intervention and prevention strategies that are able to provide timely family
support to all children at risk or in need. This future-oriented approach is
grounded in the proposition that society should make a social investment in
children (Stafford, Parton, & Vincent, 2011), in recognition that they have positive
rights that require society to provide them with an environment in which they
can all flourish and achieve, as far as possible, their potential within their birth-
family setting. In countries with limited state resources juxtaposed with extensive
poverty, however, both intervention models are problematic.
The state’s child protection and welfare roles and responsibilities are, of
course, contingent upon what it perceives to be in the “public interest.”
The State-as-Parent: The Public Interest Issues
The “public interest,” which Lasswell (1930, p. 264) conceptualized as the
displacement of private interests onto the state, is premised on the proposition
that the private sphere—parents and family caring for, and other adults
exploiting, children—can do “harm” to others—children—so justifying the state’s
intervention to “correct” the “adverse” consequences of such private actions (Mill
1859/1963). This brings into focus the need for the state to establish an
appropriate balance of individual and collective responsibility, the key to which
is the respective importance of the negative and positive right of individuals
(Berlin, 1969; Goodin, 1982). A negative right is the right of an individual to be
free from collective control, interference, or obstacles—the right of individuals-
as-parents to be free from state interference with their legitimate parenting
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activities, a right recognized, with caveats, under Article 8 (Right to respect for
private and family life) of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Court of Human Rights,
2000). A positive right is the right of individuals to be able to take control of their
lives—the right of individuals-as-children to have the capacity to be able,
eventually, to exercise the adult right of self-determination, so emphasizing the
state provision of child protection and welfare support.
The state can choose to use—or not to use—its coercive power to protect and
promote the “public interest” by making people do what they would not
otherwise have done, but, as Flathman (1980, p. 6) argues, “power as distinct
from episodic uses of raw force and violence—is impossible in the absence of
values and beliefs shared between those who wield power and those subject to
it.” The outcome of any “public interest” decision has profound implications for
the precise nature of the collective action—if any—that is put in place to manage
a society’s common affairs (Kooiman, 1993, 1999). Thus, “public interest”
decisions on the appropriate balance of individual and collective responsibility
for the protection and welfare of children must be at least tolerably in accordance
with the culturally and religiously informed shared values that give rise to the
social construction of the meaning of childhood, the upbringing of children, and
the boundaries of acceptable parenting behavior and child practices. This
significantly influences whether compliance or antagonism follows the choice of
child protection and welfare intervention and prevention strategies. This depends
upon how those affected justify, to themselves and to others, the constraints and
costs that they tolerate being imposed upon them by the state in the “public
interest” (Dixon, 2003). This, in turn, crucially depends on the level of trust that
prevails between the state and its citizens.
The State-as-Parent: The Trust Issues
In any society, the trust that people have in others, individually or collectively,
exists only insofar as they all act according to, and are secure in, the expected
futures constituted by the presence of each other (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). This
trust informs their expectations about the future behavior of others. The importance
of trust is that it enhances the likelihood of tolerance and cooperation (Mayer,
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McAllister, 1995), even to the extent of personal
sacrifices made for the collective well-being (Sztompka, 1996). Fukuyama (1995, p.
7) expresses this point admirably: “a nation’s well-being . . . is conditioned by a
single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in a society.”
Thus, the level of trust that exists between the state and its citizens
significantly influences whether compliance or antagonism follows any “public
interest” decisions made that shift the balance of individual and collective in
favor of the state in order to better protect and support children. Implementation
of any particular child protection or welfare intervention strategy depends on
governments building and sustaining the trust of those from whom compliance is
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expected; to do otherwise threatens a breach of the “boundaries of distrust”
(Scharpf, 1991, p. 297). This means, again, that the development and implementa-
tion of public child protection and welfare policies must be on the basis of shared
expectations about the future behavior of all the actors involved. Only where
levels of trust are high can the state be confident that cooperation and compliance
will be the consequences of its choice of child protection and welfare strategies.
Where trust is high, citizens may accept, in principle, the state regulating
unacceptable behavior more readily, but they still have to make a decision on the
ethical acceptability of prohibiting particular parenting behaviors or particular
child practices.
The State-as-Parent: The Ethical Issues
Standards of behavior govern the lives of individuals, fashioning their self-
image and representing their actuality (Hegel, 1821/1991, p. 190). This requires
them to justify, to themselves and to others, what constitutes unacceptable
standards of parenting behavior and what child practices should be prohibited.
This moral justification can be based on the belief that such behaviors or practices
are
 “wrong” because they are contrary to indubitable moral imperatives;
 “shameful” (not “virtuous”) because they are contrary to the socially con-
structed and accepted expectations of a moral group that adjudicates on the
morality of behavior and practices of its members;
 “bad” because of their net negative consequences; and
 “unacceptable” because they are contrary to the moral opinions held by those
affected.
Any, all, or some combination of these ethical perspectives can influence
the beliefs and values about whether, and how, the state should protect its
children from harm and promote their well-being. Thus, a law that is premised
on a view that there are adult actions that are “harmful” to children, so
justifying some form of “punishment,” may well alienate those in society who
reject the ethical premises underpinning that law. Their antagonism follows
their unwillingness to tolerate the limitations that the state imposes upon them
in the “public interest.” There are also situations in which such adults may be
confronted with conflicting imperatives. When the state prohibits a course of
action because it is “harmful” to children, but it is one that their moral group
(their social, religious, ethnic, or tribal group) permits—even requires—the
dilemma they face can only be resolved by compliance with one imperative or
the other. An example would be if the state prohibits female genital mutilation,
but the responsible parents know that within their cultural context it will be
difficult for a girl child to remain within the community without such
mutilation, which would isolate and damage her.
The next section examines the implications of different theoretical approaches
to ethics for the regulation of parenting by states.
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Deontological Ethics
Under this ethical perspective (Fried, 1978), the absolute morality of human
behavior is judged by whether it conforms to the imperatives that make certain
behaviors intrinsically “right”—a moral imperative (Kant, 1781/1956; see also
Kant, 1785/2003). Thus, moral principles emphasize moral directives, as self-
evident moral truths, that express the behavioral requirements of the moral rule-
givers—those with the moral authority (parents, elders, governments, ecclesias-
tics, or God) to create moral obligations—a sense of duty—on the part of
moral rule-takers. The latter are expected to behave in accordance to what is
“right”—do what is permitted or acceptable, and not do what is forbidden or
unacceptable—because they accept the authority of moral rule-givers over them.
The dilemma is that there are multiple moral rule-givers. Of particular
relevance is moral authority grounded in the principle that a human action is
“right” or “wrong” only if God approves or disapproves it. Thus, what is “right”
is obedience to the divine will (Quinn, 1999). The moral imperatives traditionally
either drawn or deduced from revealed theology (Adams, 1987) or from divine
prophecy (Rahman, 1958) are, however, diverse and contending. Thus, the
parenting behaviors and child practices that a state deems to be “harmful” to
children—the “wrong” behaviors and practices—must not be incompatible with
what, under the prevalent sociocultural traditions and values, constitutes the
“right” behaviors and practices.
In countries where the concept of childhood, parenting norms, and acceptable
child practices are proscribed by entrenched and uncompromising social
attitudes, underpinned and reinforced by religious imperatives, the role of the
state is seriously constrained, typically, by traditions and values embedded in
hierarchical, patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal societies. In Middle Eastern
societies, for example, which are grounded in traditional Arab-Islamic and tribal
cultures that reinforce patriarchy and hierarchy, particularly with respect to
gender and age (Al-Krenawi & Kimberley, 2013, p. 216):
Progressive protection and welfare approaches will probably necessitate
complex efforts at finding pathways to child-youth centered awareness,
visions, policies, and programmes, framed in ways which enable navigat-
ing the varied and diverse paths through regional expressions of culture
(such as the murder of women and children to uphold family honor),
local politics (such as societal conflicts and violence), and religion (such
as lack of active prohibitions on child brides). These political-religious
interfaces are the contextual considerations facing Arab and external
activists, professionals, and governments, as they attempt to create, or
expand, social action and social responsibilities in child protection and
social care, locally and through multilateral action.
In India, which is largely a patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal society, with
a set of values informed to varying degrees by its major religions, the contextual
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considerations facing external activists, childcare professionals, and governments,
as they attempt to create, or expand, child protection and welfare capacities and
capabilities, have prompted the national government to accommodate divergent
constructions of the meaning of childhood, parenting, child protection, and family
child protection and welfare responsibilities, by allowing each of its major
religious communities to have its own laws governing marriage, divorce,
succession, adoption, guardianship, and child maintenance (Stanley, 2013). The
national government only changes these laws upon the request of a religious
community. This approach obviates the need for the state to deal with the
nuances of diverse shared values in relation to fundamental family issues that
impact on the protection and well-being of children, but it does constrain state
power to intervene only when child protection or welfare issues become an
imperative. Thus, “[t]he type of family life an Indian child experiences is,
therefore, shaped by where they are born, and the religious and ethnic group into
which they are born” (Stanley, 2013, p. 171).
Virtue Ethics
Under this ethical perspective (MacIntyre, 1985; Ridley, 1997), a virtuous act
is the act of a virtuous individual—one who is naturally predisposed to act in a
virtuous way, for virtuous reasons, and will feel pleasure in so doing, thus
becoming a flourishing person. Virtue is, therefore, a disposition that precedes the
choice of a virtuous course of action. To achieve virtuousness, according to
Aristotle (350 BC/2004: I, p. 7), requires individuals to develop this disposition as
an intrinsic part of their identity and to acquire their moral precepts from their
community participation (Johnston, 1997). Thus, virtuous individuals’ choice of
the right course of action is determined by the shared moral experience in a
particular sociocultural milieu that gives rise to the character traits and behaviors
that they agree their moral communities can expect them to exhibit. This makes
relative both morality and its derivative, virtuous human behavior (Crisp & Slote,
1997; MacIntyre, 1985).
The dilemma is that there are multiple understandings of what constitutes
“virtuous” or “shameful” parental behaviors and child practices. Those behaviors
and practices that a state deems to be “harmful” to children—the “shameful”
behaviors and practices—must not be incompatible with the sociocultural
traditions and values that contribute to the culturally informed constructions of
what constitutes “virtuous” parental behaviors and child practices. This becomes
problematic in countries with long-standing public child protection and welfare
systems that are required, without discrimination, to protect and advance the
welfare of children of a diverse array of families who adhere to different
parenting norms and standards of acceptable child practices.
In Australia, a culturally, linguistically, and ethnically diverse society, the
child protection and welfare systems are increasingly involved with protecting
and supporting children of refugee families. Many such families have histories of
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trauma, dislocation, and loss (Tsantefski & Connolly, 2013). These experiences,
when added to the cultural adjustment problems such families face, pose
significant challenges to parenting practices that are the product of their
prior immersion in the cultural practices of their country of origin and
the consequence of their current social exclusion and isolation in their new
country of residence. The outcome may be child abuse or neglect. According to
Tsantefski and Connolly (pp. 265–266), difficulties are most pronounced among
children from non-English-speaking backgrounds and those whose families arrive
with less skills and resources. Overall, however, outcomes for children in
immigrant families are comparable with those of their peers (Katz & Redmond,
2010, p. 439).
In the multi-ethnic United Kingdom, Colton and Welbourne (2013, p. 85)
highlight the dilemma being faced:
The cultural diversity. . .has challenged, and continues to challenge, [child
protection and welfare] services to find positive ways of responding to
the needs of children who have equal rights to protection under the law
to any other child, but whose families apply the cultural standards and
practices of their country-of-origin. So-called female circumcision or
female genital mutilation, and child marriage, are examples of areas in
which there has needed to be recognition of cultural diversity, and an
increase in awareness and understanding of the cultural expectations of
people in different minority groups. At the same time, however, a
strategy is needed to protect children in those communities from actions
that would be considered harmful and abusive if they were done to a
child in most other communities.
In Sweden, where there is increasing multi-ethnicity, immigrants are arriving
with different parenting norms originating in the diverse religious and cultural
beliefs and traditions in their countries of origin. This has challenging socio-
political implications. As Hessle (2013, p. 51) observes:
Secular Swedish society is challenged by a prism of religions carried by
migrants from all corners of the world. The strong generous Swedish
Welfare State, with its basis on trust-based peaceful agreement between
the individual and the state, is a challenge for migrants who have been
pushed out of their country-of-origin, where the only people one can trust
are those belonging to the same clan, church or family.
In Italy, although it is still a relatively homogeneous society—albeit with a
significant number of Islamic migrants—in which the Catholic Church has a very
significant voice in all moral debates touching upon the family, Bertotti and
Campanini (2013, p. 118) foresee: “The challenge that Italy will face in the very
near future is to rebuild a welfare system . . . that will [among other things] be able
to guarantee the inclusion of immigrant [non-Catholic] families and children . . ..”
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Consequential Ethics
Under this ethical perspective (Scheffler, 1988), the morality of human
behavior is judged by its consequences (Smart & Williams, 1973): the value of its
actual, or even intended, effects in terms of producing the greatest happiness
(pleasure) for the greatest number of people (Bentham, 1789/1970)—“the most
good”—even if this is not the intention (Gouinlock, 1972; Meyers, 1986). Hence, a
behavior can be deemed “bad” only if its negative consequences outweigh its
positive consequences, which means that if the ends justify the means, then a
behavior or practice is intrinsically “good” (Scarre, 1996; Scheffler, 1988).
The dilemma is the parenting behaviors and child practices that a state deems
to be “harmful” to children—the “bad” behaviors and practices—can produce
“good”—albeit perhaps illegal—consequences for others, which means collective
actions that reduce the “harm” to children—so producing “good” consequences
for them—gives rise to “bad” consequences for others. At issue is whether a
certain state of the world—a world in which a child is relieved of any threats to
his or her rights and well-being—is of such supreme importance that all
human behavior impacting on that state of the world must be judged by its
contribution to the production in that state of the world. Where there are other
competing interests, the question is, how far should the interests of children—
achieving “good” outcomes for them—prevail over the loss of “good” outcomes
for others?
In countries with extensive family poverty, the economic necessity of child
labor for a family’s well-being makes it difficult to distinguish between parental
neglect and the effects of poverty. This can be difficult when parents are
struggling to provide basic care for their children. India, for example, at the time
of ratifying the UNCRC, reserved the right to progressively implement provisions
relating to child labor.
Ethical Skepticisms
Under this ethical perspective (Bambrough, 1979; Lom, 1998), moral beliefs
lack truth-value, either because it is not possible to obtain the evidence to justify
any moral belief, or because moral truths are simply unknowable. Thus, the
morality of human behavior can only be judged on the basis of moral opinions,
formed on the basis of the judgment makers’ direct apprehension of a priori
emotional appreciation; the opinions are simply values grounded in their lived
experience (Scheler, 1987; Stewart, 1828/2005a, 1828/2005b). Such moral opinions
require no further justification, as they are matters of self-determined personal
taste (Nietzsche, 1888/1969, p. 121). There are, then, as many distinct moral
beliefs as there are people in the world.
While the acceptance of the value of moral diversity may make this ethical
stance attractive, because it avoids making judgments about the relative value of
different cultural valuations of different parenting behaviors and child practices,
it fails, ultimately, to offer any way of informing a state’s responses to child
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protection and welfare issues, other than delegating them to individual communi-
ties to resolve, as Stanley (2013) indicates the Indian government has done.
Conclusion
Despite the almost universal acceptance in principle by the international
community in 1991 of a naively idealistic—unrealistically optimistic—declaration
about what children have a right to expect from adults, too many children remain
at risk around the world. Parenting behaviors and child practices continue to
create physical, emotional, and moral hazards for children that threaten to
interfere with their development and education, or that are harmful to their
health, or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development. Governments
evidence a pragmatic reluctance to prohibit questionable administrative practices
(such as the recruitment of children as soldiers) and the commodification-for-
profit of the poorest and most vulnerable children (such as child trafficking, and
child pornography and prostitution); or to take all possible steps to protect
children from misguided actions that place children at risk, from neglect, and
from abuse by parents, the extended family, and kinship networks; and to
provide them with an adequate standard of living. The state may well be a
“reluctant parent” in many countries because of the dominance of powerful
community expectations hostile to its intervention into family affairs, or, at least,
the existence of irreconcilable competing community expectations on the
appropriate role of the state, and, of course, the insoluble problem of the scarcity
of public resources.
This brings into focus the extent to which a state, in the “public interest,” can
—is willing and able to—protect and advance the welfare of children within its
jurisdiction, particularly in situations where any such interventions necessitate a
redefinition of the boundaries of what constitutes acceptable parenting behaviors
or child practices in a way that would impose constraints or costs on others. To
expect the state to prevent or address the consequences of particular parenting
behaviors or prohibit particular child practices because they are hazardous to
children brings to the fore the crucial capacities a state needs, without which the
prospect of governance failure looms. The first is its knowledge capacity—being
able to gather the appropriate information and to make the judgments of its
truth-value in order know
 when parents and other adults are behaving in a way that threatens to “harm”
children;
 what the “adverse” consequences are for children of those adult behaviors;
 how “harmful“ these consequences are to children;
 how to protect children from “harm” and advance their well-being without
offending the underlying cultural constructions that inform the way children
are and should be cared for within a society;
 what preventative or corrective actions can be taken by the state to address
those “adverse” consequences;
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 under what circumstances it is in the “best interests” of the child for the state
to separate him or her from his or her parents; and
 that a decision by the state to separate a child from his or her parents against
their will is, in fact, in the child’s “best interest” and made in accordance with
applicable law and procedures.
The second is its governance capacity—having the appropriate public policy
instruments to be able to take the necessary preventative or corrective actions to
prevent or correct the “harm” experienced by children by soliciting the desired
changes in adult cognitions and behaviors. The third is its organizational capacity—
being able to direct the available resources to do what needs to be done in a timely
manner, and in a culturally sensitive way, to prevent or correct the “harm” that has
been experienced by children as a result of “harmful” adult behaviors, without
causing, inadvertently or otherwise, other forms of “harm” to those children.
For governments, this scenario brings into focus a salient governance threat
that they ignore at their peril. Any shift in the public-private boundaries of child
protection and welfare responsibilities in favor of the state that create antagonisms
brings into question the legitimacy of the governance authority of the state. This is
grounded on the unacceptability—intolerability—to those upon whom behavior
constraints or costs have been imposed by the state in the “public interest,”
particularly if those impositions are in conflict with the socially constructed views
on the rights of parents and other adults with respect to children. Noncompliance
with the policy instruments in place becomes more prevalent. Distrust in
government and its organizational capacities builds up. Governance failure looms.
Governments can enact laws to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children, but their effectiveness depends on them being supported by their
communities at large, on public resources they provide to enforce and implement
them, and on their capacity to know what needs to be done in a timely manner,
and in a culturally sensitive way.
These are the ultimate challenges facing governments if they wish to achieve
the vision of the state as the protector and promoter of the best interests of children
that is embedded in the UNCRC, to which almost all states have committed.
Note
1. All the national interpretative declarations and reservations are recorded on the United Nations CRC
treaty web pages. All quoted interpretative declarations and reservations below are available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV11&chapter=4&lang=en.
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